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Introduction1
The need to find ways to boost GDP growth is par-
ticularly important in the recovery from the current
recession. The implementation of structural reforms
aiming at decreasing anti-competitive regulations
may be one of them. The multifactor productivity
(MFP) gains obtained from such reforms could im-
prove significantly potential output growth, thereby
also facilitating the adjustment of public finances,
which have suffered from the crisis and the ensuing
recovery plans.We document in this paper some sim-
ulations, which are based on estimates of a “neo-
Shumpeterian” model and tend to show that impor-
tant MFP growth gains could be obtained in devel-
oped countries by adopting best regulation practices
in “upstream sectors”, i.e., sectors that are chief
providers of intermediate inputs to the economy.
We first describe two main channels through which
the lack of competition in sectors providing interme-
diate inputs (henceforth upstream sectors) can affect
efficiency growth in downstream sectors, by propos-
ing an extension of the “neo-Schumpeterian”
endogenous growth model of Aghion et al. (1997).
We then present the econometric model we use to
test the existence and estimate the importance of
such upstream anti-competitive effects. Next, we
describe our country-sector MFP and regulation
data, and discuss our main empirical results and the
related robustness checks. Finally, based on these
results, we provide some illustrative simulations of
the potential effects of policy reforms increasing
competition in upstream markets.
Two channels
A large and growing body of research has studied
the effects of competition on growth (for a survey,
see Aghion and Griffith 2005). While competition
can affect economic performance through various
channels, this line of research has usually focused on
the direct effects of a lack of competition in a sector
on its productivity performance. We focus here on
the effects of regulations that curb market competi-
tion in upstream sectors, such as legal barriers to
entry in non-manufacturing markets, on the produc-
tivity performance of downstream sectors.
We distinguish two main channels through which lack
of competition in upstream sectors can generate
“trickle-down effects” that affect the productivity per-
formance of other sectors. Firstly, anti-competitive
regulations in an upstream sector can reduce competi-
tion downstream if access to downstream markets re-
quires using intermediate inputs produced upstream,
particularly in the case of services inputs where
import competition is limited. For example, when fi-
nancial market regulations narrow the range of avail-
able financial instruments or products, access to fi-
nance and hence new entry and firm growth in down-
stream sectors can be made more difficult. Secondly,
even if anti-competitive upstream regulations do not
restrict market access downstream, they can still curb
incentives to improve efficiency in downstream sec-
tors or firms. When markets for intermediate inputs
are imperfect, downstream firms may have to negoti-
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ate with suppliers and can be held up by them. Re-
gulations that increase suppliers’ market power can
thus reduce incentives to improve efficiency down-
stream, since (temporary) profits that downstream
firms may expect from such improvements will have
to be shared with the suppliers. These two channels
are explicitly presented in a theoretical model, drawn
from Lopez (2010) and also explained in Bourlès et
al. (2010).
Empirical model
Our empirical analysis is based on an econometric
model that directly relates country-sector productivity
to regulatory burden indicators constructed on the
basis of OECD indicators of non-manufacturing regu-
lation and that interacts the effects of regulation with
a gap variable of distance to the productivity techno-
logical frontier (see data section below). The model
allows for persistent heterogeneity in productivity lev-
els and growth across countries and sectors, with pro-
ductivity levels and growth in follower country-sector
driven by the level and growth of the productivity
technology frontier. Such a model, which can be
viewed as an empirical implementation of a “neo-
Schumpeterian” growth framework, has been used ex-
tensively in empirical research on the determinants of
productivity growth at both the firm level (e.g.,Aghion
et al. 2005) and industry level (Nicoletti and Scarpetta
2003; Conway et al. 2006; Griffith et al. 2006).
Our baseline model is precisely the following Error
Correction Model (ECM):
where MFPc,s,t is the MFP level of a non-frontier
country-sector pair c,s in year t; MFPF,s,t is the MFP
level at the technological frontier F for sector s in
year t; REGc,s,t is the regulatory burden indicator in
each country/sector/year triad;
is the country-sector distance from the sector fron-
tier in year t; and where γs, γc,t stand for respectively
sector and country-year fixed effects and εc,s,t is a
random error term. As usual we note ln(X) the nat-
ural logarithm of variable X, and ∆lnXt = lnXt – lnXt-1
the log first difference of the variable X.
Throughout our analysis, we focus on the total ef-
fects of anti-competitive upstream regulations, i.e.,
the expression (α2 + α3 gapc,s,t-1). Note that our esti-
mates would be consistent with the neo-Schumpeter-
ian view that lack of competition is more damaging
for country-industry pairs that are close to frontier
and that compete neck-and-neck with their global
rivals only if α2 < 0 and α3 > 0. Note also that at the
steady-state, the equilibrium distance to the techno-
logical frontier (gapc,s) is decreasing with the differ-
ence (γc – γF) between the country and the frontier
technical progress effects, and increasing with the dif-
ference (REGc,s – REGF,s) between the country and
the frontier regulation levels (Bourlès et al. 2010).
Data
On the basis of the OECD and EUKLEMS country-
sector data bases, we have assembled an unbalanced
panel of 4,629 observations for 15 countries and 20
sectors over the 1984–2007 period. Empirical re-
search on the effects of competition on productivity
has used a variety of measures of competitive pres-
sures. We rely here on regulatory burden synthetic
indicators constructed on the basis of the OECD
non-manufacturing regulation elementary indicators
available in the OECD international product market
regulation database.2 These synthetic indicators
allow taking into account the trickle down effects of
competitive pressures in upstream industries on
downstream industries. They have the advantage of
being more or less explicitly linked to policies that
affect competition, as well as that of being largely
exogenous and thus minimizing potential endogene-
ity biases. The OECD elementary indicators of non-
manufacturing regulation are themselves based on
detailed information on laws, rules and market and
industry settings and cover energy (gas and electric-
ity), transport (rail, road and air) and communica-
tion (post, fixed and cellular telecommunications),
retail distribution and professional services, with
country and time coverage varying across industries.
In addition we also use here the indicator of restric-
tions to competition in financial services constructed
by de Serres et al. (2006).
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2 These indicators are publicly available at www.oecd.org/eco/pmr.
See Bourlès et al. (2010) for details on the construction of the reg-
ulatory burden synthetic indicators, as well as for explanations on
our measures of the other variables in the econometric model:
country MFP and MFP country sector gap to the sector technolog-
ical frontier.
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The Figure  shows the sample average by country of
the regulatory burden indicators in 1985, 2000 and
2007 as well as the 2000 and 2007 sector average, and
corresponding best practice.3 The changes over-time
reflect the evolution of non-manufacturing regula-
tion and de-regulation in the countries covered by
the sample. In spite of the convergence in policies in
recent years important cross-country differences
remain in 2007.
Empirical results
The OLS estimates for different specifications of our
empirical model are presented in Bourlès et al.
(2010, Table 1).4 The estimates are
consistent with the implications of
our “neo-Schumpeterian” model.
MFP growth in the sector of the
leader country has a positive and
highly significant influence on MFP
growth in the less productive sec-
tors of other countries, indicating a
sizeable rate of technological pass-
through. The technology gap has
also a positive and significant influ-
ence showing that countries tend to
catch up in the sectors where they
lag behind the leader country.
Finally, as predicted, our indicator
of regulatory burden is found to
curb MFP growth and increasingly
so, the closer MFP level is to the
technological frontier. It has indeed
a very significant influence due to
its interaction with the MFP gap,
even if it us not statistically differ-
ent from zero when estimated at its
mean.5 This influence is stronger
for country/sector/period triads
that operate close to the technolo-
gical frontier, since the interaction
term coefficient is significantly po-
sitive (α3 < 0).
Interestingly, anti-competitive re-
gulation in upstream sectors
seems to have played an increasingly damaging role
in MFP growth in the more recent period. Indeed,
when we distinguish the two sub-periods 1985–94
and 1995–2007, the estimated average impact of the
regulatory burden indicator, which is non significant-
ly positive in the first sub-period, becomes signifi-
cantly negative in the second sub-period. At the
same time, the attenuating effect of the interaction
of the regulatory burden and gap on MFP growth is
more than halved.
The more negative impact of anti-competitive regu-
lation on MFP growth in the recent period seems a
robust finding which will need further investigation.
It is likely to be related to two major sources of eco-
nomic structural change during this period: global-
ization and the diffusion of ICT technologies. With
increased integration of the world economy compe-3 In the Figure, as well as in our simulations here, best practice for
the regulatory burden indicator in a given sector is constructed on
the basis of the average of the three lowest values of the underly-
ing elementary regulation indicators in the upstream sectors across
countries.
4 Our estimates are quite robust to changes in data coverage and
variable definitions, as documented in Bourlès et al. 2010.
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5 The F-test of joint equality to zero of α1, α2 and α43 and that of
α2 and α3 are very strongly rejected.
tition becomes tougher for firms in downstream sec-
tors, and ICT adoption and the corresponding reor-
ganization of production processes become increas-
ingly compelling for them. Thus, the erosion of re-
turns from efficiency improvements due to their ap-
propriation by regulated upstream sectors is likely to
be more damaging for productivity incentives, and
barriers to entry in upstream sectors are likely to be
increasingly reflected in a drag on sector-level pro-
ductivity performance. Note that such changing ef-
fects of anti-competitive regulation are different
from the ones reflecting different levels of country-
sector development as captured by the MFP gap.
Results of simulation exercises
To illustrate our results and their implications, we
propose a simulation of the MFP gains for 24 OECD
countries under the extreme assumption they would
be able to reduce their regulatory burden in the year
2010 to the level of best practice anti-competitive
regulation observed in upstream sectors in 2007.
Precisely, the simulated MFP
gains are computed under the
following assumptions:
– we use the estimates over the
1995–2007 period of our eco-
nometric model specification
(1) as reported in the last col-
umn of the Table of Bourlès et
al. (2010);
– we assume that the distance to
the technological frontier, for
each country-sector and the
level of anti-competitive regu-
lations in upstream sectors, are
the same in 2010 as the ones
known in 2007; the regulatory
burden indicator is computed
using the country input-output
tables;
– we also assume that the best
practice upstream regulation
indicators adopted in 2010 by
the countries are defined as the
average of the three lowest val-
ues observed in 2007 of the anti-competitive regu-
lation indicators in the upstream sectors across
countries.6
The Table shows the impacts of the simulated re-
forms on the average annual MFP growth over five
years (i.e., for the period 2011–15 since a change in
the regulatory burden is supposed to influence MFP
growth in our econometric model with a one-year
lag). These impacts are given separately for the man-
ufacturing sectors, the non-manufacturing sectors
(excluding the farm and mining sectors), the busi-
ness sectors (i.e., manufacturing and non-manufac-
turing sectors together), and for the whole economy
(where we assume that the reforms in upstream sec-
tors have no impact on the non-business sectors).
The average annual MFP growth gains from adopt-
ing best practice upstream regulations are slightly
different across countries. For the whole economy,
the gains range from 0.2 of a point in Denmark to
1.7 points in Poland.These differences reflect in fact
four underlying factors: (i) the differences in 2010
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Table
Average annual MFP growth gains from reforms implemented in 2010, 
for the period 2011–15 
in percentage points
Manufactur-
ing sectors 
(15–37)
Non-manufac-
turing sectors 
(40–74)
Business 
sectors*
(15–74)
Whole
economy** 
(01–99)
Australia 1.04 0.66 0.72 0.51
Austria 2.49 1.07 1.43 1.10
Belgium 2.90 1.27 1.64 1.24
Canada 1.75 1.00 1.16 0.81
Switzerland 2.10 0.98 1.26 0.98
Czech Republic 1.36 1.05 1.15 0.90
Germany 1.90 0.78 1.11 0.85
Denmark 0.58 0.27 0.33 0.22
Spain 1.62 0.92 1.07 0.81
Finland 1.45 0.59 0.85 0.63
France 1.58 0.62 0.80 0.58
United Kingdom 1.38 0.55 0.70 0.51
Greece 1.63 1.09 1.19 0.84
Hungary 1.00 0.84 0.89 0.64
Italy 1.61 1.16 1.27 0.97
Japan 3.29 1.58 2.02 1.62
Korea 1.76 0.76 1.13 0.88
Mexico 1.51 0.60 0.81 0.61
Netherlands 0.83 0.37 0.46 0.33
Norway 1.78 1.22 1.32 0.69
Poland 3.86 1.82 2.35 1.73
Portugal 1.77 1.33 1.43 1.00
Sweden 0.63 0.31 0.39 0.29
United States 1.32 0.52 0.66 0.49
Industry ISIC Revision 3 in brackets.
* Excluding the farm sector and the mining and quarrying industries. This field 
corresponds to the sum of the two previous columns.
** The calculations for the whole economy assume that reforms to upstream
sectors have no effect on the farm sector, the mining and quarrying industries
and the non-business sectors.
6 Note that we take into account in com-
puting such simulations of the dynamic
effect of the interaction between a change
in the regulatory burden and in the gap.
This effect appears, however, to be rather
small.
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between actual anti-competitive regulation and
best practices in upstream sectors, (ii) the different
intensity of downstream intermediate consumption
of products from the regulated upstream sectors,
(iii) the initial 2010 MFP gaps in the different coun-
try-sector pairs and (iv) a composition effect due to
the different sector weights in the different coun-
tries. The larger the excess regulatory burden and
intermediate consumption of regulated products in
the relatively more important sectors, the stronger
the gains in productivity from aligning regulations
in upstream sectors with best international practice;
conversely, the smaller the distance to frontier the
stronger the gains from deregulation.
Based on these simulation results, the 24 countries
considered thus fall into three groups: Denmark, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United States with a
relatively smaller impact on average MFP growth of
less than 0.5 of a percentage point per year; Austria,
Belgium, Japan, Poland and Portugal with a very
large impact of more than 1 percentage point per
year; the fifteen other countries an intermediate, but
still a high one, of between 0.5 and 1 percentage point
per year.
Conclusion
We find robust results showing that the expected
growth gains from structural reforms that consist of
adopting best regulation practices in sectors that are
important providers of intermediate inputs to the
economy could be important. Nonetheless much
more work needs to be done to check the soundness
of the policy recommendations that might be drawn
from our econometric and simulation results. Al-
though they appear robust, our results should be qual-
ified on at least two grounds. The simulated reforms
we consider are of course extremely drastic: adopting
the “best practices” in all upstream sectors over a
short period (here one year) would be an ambitious
and unrealistic task! Anti-competitive regulations on
product markets tend to be positively correlated with
those on labour markets, as well as negatively corre-
lated with workers’ average education and skill levels.
It is thus not unlikely that our estimates do not corre-
spond only to the impact of changes on MFP growth
in upstream product market regulations, but that they
may also reflect the growth impact of other changes in
the economic environment, such as a lessening of
labour markets regulations and increasing education
and skills of the working age population.
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